Monday, April 16 2001
Riding the Global Gravy Train - By- Rahul MahajanRahul Mahajan is a doctoral candidate at the University of Texas, Austin, TX-USA, a writer, and a campus and community activist. He can be reached at rahul@tao.ca
|
|
Power Play: A Study of the Enron Projec By-Abhay Mehta.
Published by-Orient Longman.
226 pp.
For six years in a row Fortune magazine has voted Enron, the Houston-based
natural gas and power company, the most innovative corporation in the
United States. With the world's largest online trading site, last year
Enron traded tens of billions of dollars of natural gas contracts; the
corporation's total revenues exceeded 100 billion dollars. Enron
assiduously cultivates its corporate image, donating Enron Field to the
grateful sports fans of Houston and operating charities like the PGE-Enron
Foundation, which gives hundreds of thousands annually to worthy and
non-controversial causes in Oregon.
Lulled by corporate spin, Americans have largely ignored the process by
which, in one decade, this tiny company metastasized into a global
giant62nd on the Forbes Global 500 list last year and moving up. Although
innovation is certainly part of the story, far more significant are
old-fashioned corporate practices such as influence-peddling and
human-rights violations.
Enron's exploits in the presidential campaign, ably chronicled in The
Observer, include donating $555,000 in soft money for the Republican Party
and allowing candidate George W. Bush the use of Enron corporate jets.
According to a study by the Los Angeles Times, Enron and associates gave
nearly $400,000 to Bush's two gubernatorial campaigns, nearly one third of
total corporate contributions. Rewards for this generosity include Bush's
introduction of the 1995 Environmental Health and Safety Audit Privilege
Act, the most industry-friendly of the nation's 12 polluter immunity acts,
written largely by an industry representative. Under the terms of the act,
polluters that make private, internal audits are virtually exempted from
complying with pollution regulations. Audits are then treated as privileged
information, unavailable to litigants in civil or even criminal cases.
Enron has frequently filed for protection under the act. Similarly, in
1996, Bush derailed legislative efforts to tackle the problems caused by
companies that had been grandfathered in under the 1971 Texas Clean Air
Act. The net result is that Houston's air quality is now the worst in the
nation, and every major metro area in Texas is slated to move into
noncompliance with federal air-quality norms.
Enron's international dealings, however, are not as well known here.
Enron's power plant and natural gas operations involve more than 30
countries, and frequently involve allegations of bribery, coercion, and
human-rights violations. After the Gulf War, Enron hired former Secretary
of State James Baker to lobby Kuwait for the contract to rebuild the
Shuaiba power plant. Enron got the contract, even though a German firm
underbid it by almost half. In 1995, Enron used then-National Security
adviser Anthony Lake and the U.S. Embassy to coerce Mozambique into
granting them a contract to develop the lucrative Pande natural gas
fields. Pratap Chatterjee of Corporate Watch reports that according to
Mozambique's natural resources minister, "There were outright threats to
withhold [U.S. Agency for International] development funds if we didn't
sign, and sign soon. [U.S.] diplomats, especially [the deputy chief of the
Embassy], pressured me to sign a deal that was not good for Mozambique. It
was as if he was working for Enron."
But by far the worst of Enron's international projects, arousing the most
opposition, is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) power plant in Maharashtra,
the Western Indian province that is home to Bombay. Initiated in 1992, just
as India was opening its economy to foreign investment, the project is one
of the largest private industry-government contracts in the world. It calls
for the payment of roughly $35 billion over 20 years to the Dabhol Power
Corporation (DPC), of which Enron is the chief shareholder (Bechtel
Enterprises and General Electric each have 10 percent and Maharashtra's
electricity board has 15 percent.) The first phase of the project, a
740-megawatt plant, came online in August 1999. The second and final phase
(1,444 megawatts) is scheduled to come online later this year.
Almost from the start, the project has been a major focus of
political contention, as journalist Abhay Mehta has superbly documented in
Power Play. Originally trained at MIT as a molecular biologist, Mehta
combines an encyclopedic knowledge of the power industry with a citizen's
frustration at corruption and lack of accountability on the part of
government officials and corporate executives. Already in its second
printing in India, Power Play paints a vivid picture of a government and a
political process gone mad. The Maharashtra project proposal had so many
severe flaws that even the World Bank, notorious for its development
fiascoes, wouldn't touch it. To start with, Maharashtra didn't need the
power. Although peak demand (at times of highest use) does exceed peak
supply, base-load capacity (what's needed for steady, ongoing use the day
round) is more than adequate. By virtue of the way liquefied natural gas
moves around the world in gigantic "trains" of specially refrigerated
ships, the Dabhol plant can only be a base-load plant, thus it cannot
address the peak supply shortage. Next, Enron brought virtually nothing of
its own to the project, proposing to raise capital through the World Bank,
U.S. Eximbank, and Indian capital markets. These funds, the World Bank
noted, would also be "available to finance reasonable alternative
projects." Furthermore, Enron-generated power is incredibly expensive,
costing roughly three times as much as the average of all other power used
in Maharashtra, and six times as much as the inexpensive coal-fired
base-load power it has displaced. Last year, the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board (MSEB) was forced to raise power rates 20 percent across
the board just to make its payments on the Dabhol plant. In sum, the Enron
project is the perfect antidote to the hype about the need of Third World
countries for foreign investment in "infrastructure development." India
didn't need the project; it could have done the project better itself and
it would have cost a lot less.
Last month, the MSEB stopped paying its bills to Enron entirely, saying it
didn't need the power and couldn't afford it. In response, Enron invoked
the draconian guarantees it obtained from India nearly a decade ago. As
Mehta writes, "The Republic of India staked all its assets (including those
abroad, save diplomatic and military) as surety for payments due to Enron
by MSEB." The central government now plans to honor that commitment, paying
Enron billions for power that no one will use while half the country
suffers from malnutrition.
The legal guarantees Enron obtained don't stop there. The Indian government
also waived its sovereign immunity and agreed to give English courts
jurisdiction over contract disputes. Enron even has an agreement with the
Maharashtra government to "indemnify and keep indemnified the company
against any loss sustained or incurred by the company by reason of the
invalidity, illegality or unenforceability" of the contract, known as the
Power Purchase Agreement. The old extra-territoriality imposed by Western
colonialism on China held Western citizens above the law. The new imperial
imposition is corporate extra-territoriality.
The political process by which a nominally open and democratic society like
India acquiesced to the Dabhol project is the most interesting part of
Mehta's story. On December 8, 1993, Enron and India's government signed a
Power Purchase Agreement in what, as Mehta notes, could only be called
indecent haste. The project was a major issue in Maharashtra's January 1995
legislative elections, which swept the opposition into office largely
because they opposed the "suspicious Enron deal." The new government set up
a special commission whose report caused the cancellation of the project on
August 3, 1995 and a flurry of behind-the-scenes dealing by Enron. Frank
Wisner, then U.S. Ambassador to India, campaigned strenuously against the
cancellation. Wisner, who had earlier helped Enron get a project in the
Philippines when he was ambassador there, was appointed to Enron's board of
directors after he returned from India. Four days before the central
government rescinded the cancellation, Enron gave $100,000 to the
Democratic National Committee.
While this was occurring, the state of Maharashtra filed suit to cancel the
project, contending that the Power Purchase Agreement was "violative of
several statutory provisions" and was "conceived in fraud." An Enron
official once testified before a U.S. House Committee that Enron had spent
$20 million on "education" for the project..
While the case was proceeding, Rebecca Mark, CEO of the Enron Development
Corporation, the subsidiary responsible for the Dabhol project, flew to
Bombay and miraculously obtained the state government's agreement to drop
the lawsuit. They even agreed to extend the project further. But the
government's about-face did not end there. When activists then filed a
public-interest lawsuit against the DPC, the state of Maharashtra recanted
its own claims of bribery, and had the court suppress 1,200 pages of
documents from its own aborted litigation. Having ensured the complete
cooperation of central and state governments, Enron was able to survive all
challenges.
As Mehta demonstrates, in dealings with India Enron showed open contempt
for the entire society. At one point Enron responded to a standard request
for an accounting of capital costs, with "we would advise you against
auditing project costs and predetermining return on equity." Later, company
officials wrote a memo suggesting that Indian laws establishing the
regulatory power of government agencies, governing prices, and requiring
power plants to operate efficiently and economically were inappropriate and
that Enron should not be bound by them. The memo offered a range of
"solutions," including "amending legislation."
When asked to make public the details of the Power Purchase Agreement,
Enron replied, "To a country as yet unused to the phenomenon of
privatization this may be difficult to understand, but in a competitive
market a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is the one document that affords
companies an edge over the other players in the field.You will therefore
appreciate the fact that such a document is zealously guarded by all
companies." The statement is ridiculous on its face, given the public's
right to be informed of government agreements. It reaches the height of
absurdity considering that Enron was never anywhere near a competitive
market; no other companies tendered bids for the Dabhol project, and the
agreement was concluded in secret.
Although Mehta does a remarkable job dissecting the intricacies
of power generation and business contracts, Power Play has some
shortcomings. Written in a dry and technical style, it will be rough going
for most readers. The book also tends to downplay the environmental and
human rights issues involved in the Dabhol project. Fortunately, Human
Rights Watch has produced an excellent report, available on the Internet
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/enron/enron-toc.htm. The report
details numerous human rights violations against protesters, including the
use of excessive police force, sexual assault, and harassment by thugs.
Many of these abuses were committed by security forces on the Enron
payroll, so the corporation cannot claim lack of knowledge or involvement.
The report concludes, "Many energy companies have invested in closed or
repressive countries, arguing that their investment would help develop the
local economy and thereby improve the human rights situation. But in this
case, Enron has invested in a democratic country and human rights abuses
there have increased. Enron hasn't made things better for human rights, it
has made things worse." The environmental consequences of the project
include serious waste heat from the plant, which endangers fish species
vital to local communities, and pollution of a hitherto-pristine area of
Maharashtra.
Although further disquisitions on the corporate threat to democracy,
humanity, and life as we know it are rapidly becoming superfluous, we can
still learn much from the case of Enron. In a world where corporations
routinely write laws to suit themselves, Enron stands out because of its
cavalier assumption that all laws should redound to its own benefit. In the
Latin American business press, for example, Enron executive Kathy Lynn can
be found blandly remarking that, "Through market presence [in Brazil] we
hope to be able to influence the way the regulations are written. We have a
regulatory affairs group that is active in trying to influence regulations
that affect us so we are comfortable with them."
Enron also stands out for its skill in co-opting politicians from all parts
of the spectrum to do its dirty work, and for its willingness to grease the
wheels of government with liberal doses of campaign cash . Perhaps most
striking is the way it has grown out of nothing, combining ultramodern
Internet-fueled growth with techniques rarely seen since the days of the
robber barons, when anyone sufficiently ruthless and corrupt could create
billions of dollars in equity out of thin air.
These new robber barons have not gone unopposed. Enron's dealings helped to
catalyze the formation of the National Alliance of People's Movements
(NAPM), an India-wide umbrella group comprising thousands of grassroots
organizations, including several dedicated solely to shutting down the
Enron project http://www.narmada.org/NAPM/napm.html. The NAPM recently
forced the U.S.-based Ogden Energy Group, which signed a contract for a
hydroelectric power project during Clinton's visit to India in March 2000,
to leave the country. The recent default on payments to Enron may open
space for the solution of this problem as well.
In the United States, opposition to Enron has been on a smaller scale,
confined mostly to community activism in some Texas towns. But the
potential for growth is tremendous, especially if done in coordination with
efforts elsewhere. Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the new
anti-corporate-globalization movement is the phenomenal growth in
international solidarity linkages. Best-known are the numerous links
between trade unions in the United States and those in Latin America. But
in a right-to-work state like Texas, community-to-community links may be
more important. The globalization of capital very often provides
communities in the North and in the South with the same specific corporate
enemy, giving a natural material basis for the much-called-for
globalization of resistance.
this article was first published in the Texas Observer.
Mehta maintains a website at http://www.altindia.net/enron/
Further information will soon be available at http://www.stopenron.org
View and Post comment on this article
The contents of the article are Copyright © of the author and may not be reproduced in any form without prior written permission from the author.
|